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CASE COMMENTS
ADMIRALTY: VALIDITY OF "BOTH-TO-BLAME" CLAUSE
IN BILL OF LADING
United States v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952)
The S.S. Nathaniel Bacon, a common carrier owned and operated
by petitioner, the United States, collided with the MIV Esso Belgium
as a result of the negligence of employees of both vessels. The United
States libeled the MIV Esso Belgium for damages; the MIV Esso Belgium cross-libeled for damages, including the amount for which it
might be held liable to respondent for damage to cargo aboard the
S.S. Nathaniel Bacon. The United States impleaded the cargo owners
to enforce a "both-to-blame" clause in the bills of lading providing
for indemnification by the cargo owners to the carrier for any loss
indirectly borne or to be borne by it. The district court upheld the
validity of the clause, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground
of public policy.1 On certiorari the United States Supreme Court
HEL, public policy renders invalid attempts by carriers to stipulate
against their own negligence; the loss of cargo must be borne by both
the common carrier and the vessel with which it negligently collides.
The well-established rule that common carriers cannot stipulate
for immunity from their own or their agents' negligence finds no
exception in the law of admiralty. Prior to the passage of the Harter
Act 2 and the later Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,3 carriers, as in'United States v. Farr Sugar Corp., 191 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 843 U.S. 236 (1952).
227 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §192 (1946). The Harter Act was passed to meet
ever increasing attempts to limit liability of the owners of vessels by inserting in
bills of lading stipulations against losses arising from unseaworthiness, bad stowage,
negligence, or other causes of liability. The act was designed to fix relations
between carrier and shipper and to prohibit contracts restricting the liability of
vessels in certain situations. See The Willdomino, 300 Fed. 5 (3d Cir. 1924).
349 STAT. 1207, 1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §1304 (2) (a) (1946). The "Hague Rules"
of 1921 and the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to [ocean] Bills of Lading signed in Brussels in 1924 became part of the
United States admiralty law through the passage of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act. Since passage of this act the Harter Act no longer applies to voyages to and
from the United States in foreign trade; however, if parties to a bill of lading do
not contract otherwise, the Harter Act applies to the period between the time the
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surers of the cargo, could stipulate against damage caused by unseaworthiness or improper stowage; 4 but attempts by carriers to relieve
themselves of liability to shippers for damages caused by negligent
acts of their agents or servants were held to be unjust and unreasonable attempts to abandon essential duties of their employment and
were void as against public policy.5 The Harter Act and the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act not only have altered the common law by prohibiting carriers from avoiding insurers' liability for improper stowage and unseaworthiness6 but also have modified the previously existing relations between carrier and cargo owner in that the statutes
now control what had been subject to contract. 7 Under both acts
the carrier is relieved of liability to the shipper for damages caused
by the negligent navigation or management of the vessel. If a collision is the result of negligence on the part of the carrier along with
another vessel or vessels, however, the cargo owner can proceed against
the other vessel or vessels and recover the full amount of his damages.8
After having an adverse judgment rendered against him, the noncarrier can bring action against the carrier for one half of the total
damages suffered by it, including half of the amount recovered earlier
by the cargo owner.9 Thus through the use of the divided damages
rule,' 0 which is the rule applied in the United States," the carrier
goods are discharged and the time the goods are delivered to the consignee. See
The Astri, 52 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. N.Y. 1943).
4The Henry B. Hyde, 82 Fed. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
5
E.g., Boston & Maine R.R. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439 (1918); Knott v. Botany Mills,
179 U.S. 69 (1900); Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
627 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §191 (1946); 49 STAT. 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C.
§1307 (1946).
7The Henry B. Hyde, 82 Fed. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
SThe Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
9But cf. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876) (prior to passage of the Harter Act,
cargo damages incurred in a "both-to-blame" collision could be recovered from
either ship).
a0The Third International Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law, in 1910,
promulgated a uniform system of damages wherein comparative negligence, i.e.,
the amount of damage in proportion to the degree of fault, became the basis
for the measure of damages. Although the United States was represented at the
conference, no congressional action has been taken to ratify this system in the
United States; thus the apportionment of damages is still controlled by the divided
damages rule. See The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882) (passage of the Harter
Act had no effect upon the basic system of divided damages used in the American
courts of admiralty jurisdiction).
"1E.g., The Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880).
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is liable for an equal amount of the aggregate damages suffered by
all the vessels involved in the collision, and the carrier indirectly pays
the cargo owner one half of the damages suffered by it.
Carriers, attempting to circumvent this anomaly, resorted to the
"both-to-blame" clause in bills of lading.'12 This contractual device was
designed to require the shipper to reimburse the carrier in mutualfault cases for the amount he would pay through the operation of
the divided damages rule. Thus the clause would place the burden
in a "both-to-blame" collision upon the negligent noncarrier and the
innocent cargo owner. In an earlier case, The Jason,1 3 the United
States Supreme Court upheld a stipulation in a bill of lading requiring
cargo owners to contribute in general average'4 when the sacrifice
of either the ship or cargo was the result of negligent navigation or
management of the vessel. Before the Harter Act, in the absence of a
stipulation to the contrary, general average would not lie if these
factors caused a sacrifice of ship or cargo. One of the purposes of the
Harter Act, to invalidate mutual liability provisions of this sort,
was ignored in the Jason decision.
In the instant case the trial court, relying upon the Jason case,
upheld the "both-to-blame" clause."5 The Supreme Court, in affirming the court of appeals' reversall of the lower court's decision,
did not overrule the Jason decision but did refuse to sustain the
validity of the "both-to-blame" clause on the ground that without
further congressional authority the courts will continue to act upon the
rule that stipulations against a carrier's own negligence are void. As
a result of this decision the anomaly, while imposing equal liability
in "both-to-blame" collisions, continues to allow a carrier complete
immunity from liability to a cargo owner when the carrier is solely
negligent.
The instant case illustrates a need for modification of the Harter
Act and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Since a carrier is unable to
stipulate for immunity and is held liable in "both-to-blame" collisions
through the curious operation of the applicable statutes and the
divided damages rule, it follows that the carrier should be held no
12KNAUTH,

OCEAN BIUS

OF

LADING 158 (1941).

"3225 U.S. 32 (1912).
14For an explanation of general average see 6 BFNED cr, AD iRALTY §98 (1940).
35United States v. The Esso Belgium, 90 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
IGUnited States v. Farr Sugar Corp., 191 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd sub nora.
United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
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